

The Impact of GPU-Assisted Malware on Memory Forensics: A Case Study

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The Impact of GPU-Assisted Malware on Memory Forensics: A Case Study

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Software memory acquisition



Memory Acquisition
1)For each page in pages

a)Read **p** from memory b)Write **p** to disk

Software memory acquisition



Memory Acquisition
1)For each page in pages

a)Read **p** from memory b)Write **p** to disk

Real Memory Layout



Passive Anti-forensic techniques*



* Stuttgen, J., Cohen, M., Anti-forensic resilient memory acquisition – DFRWS 2013

DMA malware*



vPro

Part number

0x4D3320373854363435334647302D43453620

Could it be worse?

- Of course, yes! ;-)
- Think about an "*external*" device that is (w.r.t. AMT):
 - more pervasive
 - more essential for the system
 - with more computational power
 - with a big reserved memory
 - easy to program
 - not supported/considered by current anti-virus software
- What can be such device?

Could it be ware?



The GPU threat

- Almost every server/laptop/smartphone has one GPU (at least)
 - Some even have multiple GPUs (e.g. optimus technology)
- GPUs:
 - are fundamental for any system that runs a GUI
 - can be easily programmed with OpenCL / CUDA / APP
 - are equipped with GBs of reserved/dedicated RAM
 - have great computational capabilities
 - ABI is not supported by anti-virus

It got the attention of the DF community...



...and media



Contributions

- Model the GPU malware from a memory-forensic perspective
- Identify which artifacts can/should be collected for an effective DF investigation
- Provide a case study for Intel GPUs
- Show novel GPU anti-forensics techniques

Outline

- I. Motivation
- II. Background
- **III.GPU-assisted malware**
- IV.Case study: Intel Integrated GPUs
- V. Conclusion

CPU



Few ALUs (e.g. 4,8,16) Complex control Logic

- Speculative execution
- Branch prediction
- 3) Cache
 - Shared LLC
 Per-core cache (smaller)

HOST MEMORY

GPU



- Many ALUs (hundreds)
 Simple control Logic
- e.g. Divergent execution paths get serialized
 3) Very small Cache



Process and Context lists



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The execution model **GPU kernel** Controlling Process Memory GPU MEMORY Data A malware can brea this execution model GPU .text Т D GPU .data

GPU anti-forensic techniques

- We identified four different techniques
 - Unlimited code execution
 - Process-less code execution
 - Context-less code execution
 - Inconsistent Memory Mapping
- Each technique
 - may require different priviledges / knowledge about the driver internals
 - allows the malware to get different level of stealthiness

Unlimited Code Execution

GPUs are non-preemptive:

If a GPU is doing computation, it cannot do rendering at the same time
The graphic driver usually enforces a timeout to kill long lasting kernels
This limits a malware activity since it needs a controlling process

However this limitation can be circumvented so that the malware can get the *Ulimited Code Execution*

Processless execution

In normal condition the graphic driver maintains a link between a task executed in the GPU and its controlling process

The GPU execution model can be broken allowing the presence of a running kernel without any controlling process

Process and Context lists



Contextless execution

The graphic drivers stores information about the task being executed on the GPU

A malware can detach its context from the list in the GPU driver and remove traces about its existence

Process and Context lists



Inconsistent Memory mapping

GPU and CPU use different information (i.e. different page tables) to perform virtual to physical address translation Usually, this pieces of information are synchronized

However, a malware can break this information to hide mapped areas that look suspicious (e.g. the keyboard buffer)

GPU-assisted malware and memory forensic

- A forensic analyst needs to answer a certain number of questions
 - Which processes are using the GPU? (List processes)
 - What code is running within the GPU? (List kernels)
 - Which part of the host memory is accessed by the GPU? (List GPU memory maps)
- Is the host memory enough to answer to these three questions?

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About our case study

- Intel Integrated GPUs of the Haswell processors family
- Linux 3.14
- Direct Rendering Manager (DRM)
 - Graphic Execution Manager (GEM)
 - i915.ko kernel module
- Beignet (OpenCL)

The Address Space Layout on Intel Haswell



Findings on Intel GPUs

Inconsistent Memory Mapping

- Change virt to phys mapping inside the PPGTT (it also breaks the W^X bit)



Process-less execution

- Kill the controlling process after the GPU kernel submission



Context-less execution

- DKOM attack on the driver data structures (after the GPU kernel execution):
 - Access the struct drm_i915_private and gets the context_list pointer
 - Call i915_gem_context_unreference() on our i915_hw_context

Unlimited Code Execution

- disable the hangheck through the sysfs, at the path

/sys/module/i915/parameters/enable hangcheck

Artifacts of Intel GPUs

- Hangcheck flag status
- struct drm_i915_private
 - List of contexts
 - List of buffer objects
 - List of process using the GPU
- PCI BAR0
 - Register file
 - GTT
 - PPGTT



Host memory limitations

AF Technique	Malware Requirem.	List Process	List Kernels	Memory map
None	U	0S	Driver	0S
Unlimited exec	S	0 S	Driver	0 S
Process-less	S	N/A	Driver	Driver
Inconsistent	К	0S	Driver	N/A
Context-less	К	N/A	N/A	N/A

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Conclusions

- GPU-assisted malware can become a serious threat in the near future
 - First PoC published (e.g. Demon)
- Lack of:
 - analysis tools
 - Memory acquisition tools supporting this threat
- OS, vendor and family seriously affects the analysis

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