



# A Metrics-Based Look at Disk Images: Insights and Applications

Lena L. Voigt, Felix Freiling and Christopher Hargreaves


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# Motivation

## A Metrics-Based Look at Disk Images



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\*Image generated using Midjourney

# Explanation of Terms Used

## Real-World vs. Scenario-Based Synthetic Disk Images



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


### Real-world disk image

- *image of a disk on which regular day-to-day activities were carried out by one or more users without the intention of creating data for digital forensic analysis or investigation.*

### Scenario-based synthetic disk image

- *produced with the intention of creating data that can be utilized for digital forensic purposes*
- *created in accordance with a scenario for digital forensic investigation:*
  - *disks from the M-57 scenarios (Digital Corpora)*
  - *forensic CTF disks with a storyline*



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# Explanation of Terms Used

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


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


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1. A **Formal Definition** of *Realism* of Synthetic Disk Images
2. **Compiling Datasets** of Synthetic and Real-World Disk Images
3. **Collecting Metrics** from Disk Image Datasets
4. Insights from a **Comparison of Synthetic and Real-world** Disk Images




## Intuitive Definition

- A realistic synthetic disk image is *indistinguishable* from a real-world disk image.

## Considerations

- What does *indistinguishable* mean? Aren't two disk images always distinguishable?
  - We need to compare sets of synthetic and real-world disk images and the distribution of values for different features.
- Some features of the disk image can be 'out of scope' for the analysis, e.g.:
  - Does the disk image exhibit virtualization artifacts?
  - Are there traces of an automation framework used?



# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

A Formal Definition



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**Concept:** Define *Realism* using a cryptography-inspired security game

**Data Sets:** *R* (Real-world disk images), *S* (Synthetic disk images)

**Security Game:**

- Verifier tries to distinguish data from *R* and *S*; can only inspect *allowed* features of the data

**Process:**

*Presentation:* Verifier is presented an item (randomly of either *R* or *S*)



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  3. Response: Measurement of the feature is provided
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
*n* Iterations (with distinct items):

If the Verifier cannot reliably distinguish synthetic and real-world data items, and we call the synthetic forensic data in set ***S*** *realistic* w.r.t. the *allowed* features.



# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

## A Formal Definition




# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

Compiling Datasets of Synthetic and Real-World Disk Images



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


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## Disk Image Collection

Conducted in September 2024, only Windows systems

- **Public**<sup>1</sup>: publ. available (Digital Corpora, CFReDS, etc.)
- **Internal**<sup>1</sup>: from five different institutions
- **Real-World**: drives from personal computers, in use between June 2012 and September 2024




Windows Version	Public <sup>2</sup>	Internal	Real-world
Windows 11	3	-	2
Windows 10	8	11	5
Windows 8.1	3	-	-
Windows 7	2	19	3
Windows Vista	1	1	-
Windows XP	6	5	1
Win. Server 2008	1	-	-
Win. Server 2022	1	-	-
Win. Server 2019	-	1	-
Gesamt	25	37	11

<sup>1</sup> scenario-based, synthetic



# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

## Collecting Metrics from Disk Image Datasets




## The Mass Disk Processor (MDP)

- Automating the collection of metrics from large sets of disk images and summarizing the results
- Allows for extraction of privacy-preserving high-level metrics

## Implementation

- pytsk/libewf wrapper for disk image access
- plugin-based architecture
- *optional* preprocessing
  - File signature extraction, sha1 calculation
- *optional* integration of existing tools
  - pyregistry, python-evtx, Plaso





### The Mass Disk Processor (MDP)

Category	MDP Metric Name	Metric Description	Value <sup>1</sup>
Configuration	disk_size	Size of the disk ( <i>converted to GB</i> )	40
	win_build_inferred_os, win_build	Windows Version and Build	Windows 10 (Build: 17763)
Longevity	windows_install	Windows Install Time	2019-03
	windows_last_shutdown	Windows Last Shutdown	2024-03
	win_os_lifetime	Windows OS Lifetime ( <i>in days</i> )	1809.04
Activity	win_total_login_count	Windows Login Count	33
	no_start_menu_lnk_total	Number of Startmenu Lnk Files	49
	chrome_history_entries_total	Chrome History Entries	0
Volume	no_non_nsrl_files	Number of non-NSRL Files	139864
	audio_files	Number of Audio Files	279
	video_files	Number of Video Files	31
	office_files	Number of Office Files	43
Notables	no_signature_mismatches	Number of Signature Mismatches	4428
	evtx_clock_change_4616	Number of Clock Change Events	9


<sup>1</sup> Values for DFRWS EU 2024 – Rodeo Image (Bytebusters)

# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

Insights from a Metrics-Based Comparison



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## Synthetic Scenario-Based Disk Images vs. Real-World Disk Images

- Configuration:
  - Disk size, operating system(s) installed, number of users, applications installed, default browsers
- Longevity
- Activity
- Volume



<sup>1</sup> source: [microsoft.com/edge](https://microsoft.com/edge)


<sup>2</sup> source: [google.com/chrome](https://google.com/chrome)

<sup>3</sup> source: [mozilla.org/de/firefox](https://mozilla.org/de/firefox)



## Synthetic Scenario-Based Disk Images vs. Real-World Disk Images

- Configuration
- Longevity:
  - File system lifespan, Windows operating system lifetime
- Activity
- Volume



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


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## Synthetic Scenario-Based Disk Images vs. Real-World Disk Images


- Configuration
- Longevity
- Activity:
  - Number of logins, number of USB drives attached, number of browser history entries, number of browser searches
- Volume





## Synthetic Scenario-Based Disk Images vs. Real-World Disk Images

- Configuration
- Longevity
- Activity
- Volume:
  - Number of files, number of user folder files,  
number of files per type:
    - Office files
    - PDF files
    - Audio files
    - Video files






# Realism of Synthetic Disk Images

Insights from a Metrics-Based Comparison



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# Compiling Datasheets for Disks Images

An Overview of Publicly Available, Scenario-Based Synthetic Disk Images



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## Providing Metrics for Public Disk Images

1. **Datasheets** for individual disk images
2. **Summary table** for public disk images
  - Facilitate the selection of a public disk image that fits specific needs:

- **Long Windows Lifetime**
- Rich Firefox browser history
- High volume of files

	A	AE	AF	AG
1	<b>Identifier</b> ▾	<b>win_os_life_days</b> ▾	<b>windows_install</b> ▾	<b>windows_last_shut</b> ▾
2	DFRWSRodeo24	1809.04	2019-03	2024-03
3	MagnetCTF19	233.48	2018-07	2019-03
4	BelkaCTF1	196.32	2020-08	2021-02
5	OpenUni22	138.08	2023-09	2024-02
6	InCTF20	131.31	2020-03	2020-07
7	CellebriteCTF21	127.83	2021-03	2021-07
8	MagnetCTF20	68.82	2020-02	2020-04
9	M57-08	68.17	2008-05	2008-07
10	MagnetCTF23	43.09	2022-11	2023-01
11	BelkaCTF5	38.75	2022-06	2022-07

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	A	BV	BW
1	<b>Identifier</b> ▾	<b>firefox_history_entries</b> ▾	<b>firefox_google_searches</b> ▾
2	M57-09Charlie	1080	40
3	M57-08	489	40
4	M57-09Jo	422	17
5	M57-09Pat	295	13
6	BelkaCTF5	240	77
7	InCTF20	85	12
8	CCIKip	82	9
9	CellebriteCTF21	50	4
10	DefenitCTF20	3	0
11	M57-09Terry	1	0

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- **High volume of user files**

	A	O	P	Q	R
1	Identifier	files_in_users_folder	non_nsrl_files	office	pdf
2	MagnetCTF23	111193	81328	12	8
3	CellebriteCTF21	48299	145014	24	40
4	BelkaCTF5	23859	85805	16	11
5	MagnetCTF22	17596	161010	24	8
6	Bart23	13780	97824	18	3
7	BelkaCTF1	13443	86277	15	23
8	M57-09Pat	11989	20763	44	62
9	Owl19	11409	104225	27	545
10	Hadi2	11224	16499	35	18
11	MagnetCTF20	10164	76977	34	1



Metrics do not eliminate the **need for qualitative assessment**:

- Complexity of evidence recovery
- Difficulty in reconstructing the scenario
- Coherence of the underlying storyline

Sole focus on metrics can undermine qualitative considerations:

- Longevity ↑: Clock manipulations
- Activity ↑: Arbitrary launching of programs
- Volume ↑: Depositing large numbers of random files



### 1. Larger scale collection of disk metrics

- For real-world as well as synthetic disk images

### 2. Implementing further metrics

- Metrics for different use cases, multiple metrics for the same characteristic
- Cross-plugin metrics
- Cross-device metrics for more complex cases

### 3. Exploring further applications

- Metric Sharing for Non-Shareable Data
- Evaluation of Synthesis Proposals
- Lab Metrics (for cost/resource estimation or prioritization)



# Conclusion

## A Metrics-Based View of Disk Images



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### Contribution:

- Mass Disk Processor (MDP) Framework: Open-Source Framework for Retrieving Disk Metrics in Bulk
- Formal definition of *Realism* in synthetic disk images
- Comparison of scenario-based and real-world disk images
- Datasheets for public disk images

### Further Application Scenarios:

- Sharing of non-shareable data,
- Lab metrics,
- Prioritization, etc.



<https://github.com/lenavoigt/mass-disk-processor>



**MDP Code**



**Summary sheet** of public disk images



**Individual datasheets** for public disk images



**Plaso timelines** for public disk images